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California v. Ciraolo: The Demise of Private Property
After receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in
the backyard of Dante Ciraolo, two police officers trained in marijuana
identification went to investigate the area. A six-foot outer fence and
a ten-foot inner fence prevented ground-level observation. In light of
their plans to investigate some twelve additional tips involving nearby
marijuana cultivation, the undaunted duo rented a private plane which
flew at an altitude of 1,000 feet over the Ciraolo home. Using only the
naked eye, the officers identified marijuana plants of eight to ten feet
in height growing inside the enclosed backyard of the Ciraolo residence
and photographed the plants with a 35mm camera before pursuing
additional aerial investigations. The officers then went before a mag-
istrate and executed an affidavit describing their observations and the
tip which prompted the surveillance. An aerial photo of the house, yard,
and neighboring homes was attached to the affidavit. A warrant was
issued, and seventy-three marijuana plants were seized. In the trial court,
Ciraolo unsuccessfully moved to suppress the seized marijuana and was
convicted of the charged offense. The California Court of Appeal re-
versed the conviction on the ground that the warrant used to seize the
plants was based upon a constitutionally invalid search of respondent's
yard which rendered the evidence inadmissible.' The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the marijuana was obtained pursuant
to a valid warrant based upon a constitutionally permissible warrantless
aerial observation since the Fourth Amendment does not require police
traveling in public airways at 1,000 feet to obtain a warrant in order
to observe things visible to the naked eye. California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
The police have increasingly used the airways in an effort to enforce
laws against marijuana cultivation. Documents released to the National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) under the
Freedom of Information Act reveal that thousands of aerial searches
have been conducted in the United States since the late 1970's.2 These
practices have presented the courts with many constitutional challenges. 3
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. App. 1st Cir. 1984) rev'd,
California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
2. Zeese, Aerial Searches For Marijuana, 9 Search and Seizure L. Rep. 33 (1982).
3. See Comment, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains
for Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 725 n.5 (1985) (for example, United States v.
Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir. 1984); Nat. Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp.
945 (N.D.Cal. 1985)).
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In aerial surveillance cases, the initial constitutional query is whether
the aerial observations are sufficiently intrusive to amount to a search
invoking the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. In the 5-4 Ciraolo
decision, the Supreme Court considered the additional problems presented
by aerial inspection of private residences.
This paper reviews the historical background of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the extra protection traditionally afforded the home and those
areas closely associated with it. The discussion then turns to the majority
and dissenting opinions in Ciraolo and their suggested implications con-
cerning the use of the property doctrine in Fourth Amendment search
cases.
Historical and Jurisprudential Look at the Fourth Amendment
The original version of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution indicated that the framers' primary concern was with over-
reaching warrants rather than with warrantless searches. 4 The Senate,
however, adopted the present version of the Fourth Amendment which
contains two clauses. The first clause prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the second clause establishes requirements for the
issuance of warrants. Although the relationship between the two clauses
has been the subject of much controversy, 6 the general consensus is that
a warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable7 unless it is con-
ducted within one of the judicially established and "well delineated
4. For an interesting discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment see generally
T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation (1969), and Reynard, Freedom
from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 Ind.
L.J. 259 (1950).
5. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall no: be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 1364 (1949), overruled on other
grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961).
6. See Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 455, 461 (1984); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cfii.
L. Rev. 47, 48, 72-73 (1974).
7. "It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may
not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable
cause to do so." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2682 (1981).
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exceptions" to the warrant requirement.8 Otherwise, evidence obtained
is considered to be the product of an unreasonable search and is excluded
both to deter overzealous police work and to maintain "judicial in-
tegrity." 9
Although there exists an abundance of cases involving the Fourth
Amendment, no clear cut rules govern when the amendment's protection
will be invoked, for the language of the amendment possesses "both
the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity." 10 Many definitional
words within the Fourth Amendment reflect suggested boundaries for
its use. Of particular importance are the words "searches and seizures"
which define the scope of the amendment, in that, unless there is a
search or seizure, Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
action is not activated. The meaning attached to these and other words
is extremely important, for the determination of the scope of the Fourth
Amendment reflects "our society's current balancing of the private cit-
izen's right of privacy and security against the interest of the government
in detecting and preventing crime."" Thus, the first step in examining
8. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 768, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2042-43 (1969). See generally Charles Whitebread's discussion
of the two possible views regarding the interrelationship between the two clauses of the
Fourth Amendment. C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure 103 (1980).
9. "But it is not deference alone that warrants the exclusion of evidence illegally
obtained-it is 'the imperative of judicial integrity."' Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S.
219, 224, n.10, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 2011 n.10 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1447 (1960)). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659,
81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694 (1961); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65, 74 S. Ct. 354,
356 (1954). Note, however, that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
emasculates the contention that judicial integrity mandates exclusion of illegally obtained
evidece. The "good faith" exception established in Leon permits the use of evidence
obtained pursuant to a subsequently validated warrant. The court stated that "[penalizing
the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his error, cannot logically contribute
to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Id. at 3419. In a footnote, the court
felt it necessary to state that their holding does not implicate the integrity of the courts.
Id. at 3419-20, n.22. It seems apparent, however, that the Leon Court considers the
deterrence factor the primary reason for excluding evidence. The opinion may also reflect
"Justice White's unwillingness to suggest that the exclusionary sanction might well be an
appropriate remedy for substandard judicial, as opposed to police, action." Lamonica,
Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, 45 La. L. Rev. 500,
504 (1984).
10. J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966).
11. Comment, The Relationship between Trespass and Fourth Amendment Protection
after Katz v. United States, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 709 (1977).
"The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
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aerial surveillance in light of the Fourth Amendment is to determine
what constitutes a search.
Constitutionally Protected Areas
The Supreme Court originally interpreted the Fourth Amendment
in light of English property rights.12 The amendment was applicable only
when there was a physical trespass into "a constitutionally protected
area."' 3 Such areas were never clearly delineated, but the term "ap-
parently referred to those places, paradigmatically the home, accepted
by society as areas where a large measure of privacy and security from
government intrusion should be enjoyed.' ' 4 Also within the protection
of the Fourth Amendment were those areas closely allied with the home
where "the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life"' took place. 5
Certain property, however, received no Fourth Amendment protec-
tion even if a trespass occurred. In Hester v. United States, 6 revenue
agents observed a sale of illegal liquor in front of the defendant's father's
home. A field approximately 200 yards from the house was searched
without a warrant, and two jugs of bootleg whiskey were seized. The
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim, stat-
ing that "the special protection accorded ... to the people in their
'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields." ' ' 7
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S.
Ct. 341, 344 (1914).
12. Comment, supra note 6, at 462 n.34. See particularly Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), which involved a trespass action for breaking and entering
Entick's home under a warrant issued by the Secretary of State (who lacked jurisdiction).
"The defendants have no right to avail themselves of . . . these warrants .... [Our law
holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set foot upon his neighbour's
close without his leave." Id. at 817.
13. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 257, 266 n.64 (1984). See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.
Ct. 564 (1928).
14. Wasserstrom, supra note 13, at 266 n.64 (1984).
15. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984) (quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532 (1886)). See generally
Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed Significance
to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 795
(1985).
16. 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445 (1924).
17. Id. at 59, 44 S. Ct. at 446.
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Four years after Hester, the Supreme Court better articulated the
scope of the Fourth Amendment in light of trespass doctrine. In Olin-
stead v. United States,"t police tapped the defendant's phone through
telephone lines located on the street. The Court found no Fourth Amend-
ment violation because there was no seizure of "tangible material effects"
nor was there an "actual physical invasion" of defendant's home or
his surrounding yard.' 9 The test of whether or not a search occurred
apparently was based upon the finding of a physical trespass, whereas
the question of the reasonableness of that search turned upon the type
of property involved. A trespass of a home or an immediately sur-
rounding area was unreasonable in the absence of a warrant, but a
similar trespass of an open field was considered reasonable.20
The Supreme Court began to move away from a strict application
of property concepts in Silverman v. United States,2 where the war-
rantless use of an electronic listening device which had been pushed
through a common wall was found to be an invasion of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights. The Court did "not pause to consider whether
or not there was a technical trespass under local property law relating
to party walls" because "[i]nherent Fourth Amendment rights are not
inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property
law." ' 22 The decision rested instead upon a concept of privacy found
"[a]t the very core" of the Fourth Amendment which grants a man
18. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
19. Oimstead, 277 U.S. at 466, 48 S. Ct. at 568. By negative implication, the Court
considered the house and surrounding yard as constitutionally protected areas, viewing
the Fourth Amendment as a protector of property from physical encroachment rather
than as a comprehensive protector of "Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions, and their sensations" from "unjustifiable intrusion by the govern-
ment... whatever the means." Id. at 478, 48 S. Ct. at 572 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20. [T]he rule of Hester v. United States, supra, which we reaffirm today, may be
understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy
for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately
surrounding the home .... This rule is true to the conception of the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment reflects the rec-
ognition of the Founders that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary
government interference. For example, the Court since the enactment of the
Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.'
Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S., at 601, 100 S. Ct., at 1387-88. ...
(other cites omitted)
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984).
21. 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679 (1961).
22. Id. at 511, 81 S. Ct. at 682.
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the right "to retreat into his own home and there be free from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion. 23 Thus, although initially only areas
approximate to the boundaries of a person's property were covered, the
stage was set for expansion of the Fourth Amendment's protection
beyond physical trespass.
Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In Katz v. United States,24 the Supreme Court went beyond its
property-related interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. FBI agents
had installed an electronic listening device onto the outside of a public
telephone booth being used by the defendant to transmit wagering
information. The government argued that the booth was not an area
constitutionally protected under the Fourth Amendment. The core of
the majority opinion was that the "Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places."21 5 From that starting point, the Court concluded that "[w]hat
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . [blut
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. 2 6 The Court further stated
that "once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people
. . .against unreasonable searches . . . it becomes clear that the reach
of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion. ' 27 Because the defendant had "justifiably relied"
upon the privacy of the booth, an impermissible search had taken place
even without any physical trespass of his property.2 Furthermore, the
"strong probability" that Katz was engaging in illegal activity did not
render the search reasonable.2 9
Although the majority opinion in Katz considered whether the FBI
had violated "the privacy upon which he [Katz] had justifiably relied," 30
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, articulated in Justice Har-
lan's concurring opinion, became crucial in Fourth Amendment search
cases. The test consists of a two part inquiry: (1) Did the person
challenging the search exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of pri-
23. Id. at 511, 81 S. Ct. at 683.
24. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
25. Id. at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 353, 88 S. Ct. at 512 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 356, 88 S. Ct. at 514.
30. Id. at 353, 88 S. Ct. at 512.
1987] NOTES 1371
vacy? (2) Is that expectation one that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable?3
The Warren Court failed to define what constituted a reasonable
expectation of privacy, leaving the language, as one cynical commentator
remarked, as "little more than readily manipulable cant."32 Interpretation
of the Katz decision was not aided by Justice Harlan's later expression
of second thoughts about the usefulness of inquiring into a subjective
expectation of privacy.33 In Katz, however, the Court did indicate its
future direction by stating that the Fourth Amendment's protections go
further than mere protection of the privacy of persons "and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all." 34 Thus, whatever the Katz privacy
concept may be, "the Court unquestionably intended it to expand, not
to replace, the Fourth Amendment's traditional coverage. . .. "I'
In the cases following Katz, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
no single dispositive factor determines when an individual has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.3 6 Justice Harlan noted that the deter-
mination of Fourth Amendment protection generally requires reference
31. Id. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Anthony Amsterdam strongly objects to the frequent use of the test developed in the
concurrence:
[Tihe common formula for Katz fails to capture Katz at any point because the
Katz decision was written to resist captivation in any formula. An opinion which
sets aside prior formulas with the observation that they cannot 'serve as a
talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem' should hardly be read
as intended to replace them with a new talisman.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 385 (1974).
32. Wasserstrom, supra note 13, at 271.
33. "The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations
or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume,
are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of
the past and present." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 1143
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. 389 U.S. at 350, 88 S. Ct. at 510.
35. Wasserstrom, supra note 13, at 268.
36. Some factors to be considered
[iln assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy
... [are] the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e.g., United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2481-2482, 53 L.Ed.2d
538 (1977), the uses to which the individual has put a location, e.g., Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265, 80 S.Ct. 725, 733, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960),
and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous
protection from government invasion, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). These factors are equally relevant to
determining whether the government's intrusion upon open fields without a
warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations of privacy and is
therefore a search proscribed by the Amendment.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984).
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to places,3 7 and, in fact, cases following Katz suggest that the pre-Katz
analysis of constitutionally protected areas still maintains some vitality.
In Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa
Corp.,38 the Supreme Court based its decision upon the pre-Katz dis-
tinction between open fields and those lands not accessible to the public.
A health inspector walked onto the defendant's property to test chimney
emissions for violations of air quality standacds. The defendant claimed
that the warrantless entry was an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. The majority stated that "[tihe field inspector was on
respondent's property, but we are not advised that he was on premises
from which the public was excluded." 3 9 In addition, "[hie had sighted
what anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in the sky-
plumes of smoke." 4 Reference was then made to the Court's refusal
in Hester to extend the Fourth Amendment to objects observable in
"the open fields." The Court in Air Pollution Variance Board clearly
relied upon property concepts to distinguish non-public areas from sights
visible in the open fields.
The Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinoisel went beyond a mere
reaffirmation of the pre-Katz property distinction and actually narrowed
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to property interests and the "un-
derstandings" of society.4 2 The defendants in Rakas had been passengers
in a car that was stopped, searched, and found to contain incriminating
evidence. Defendants were convicted after denial of their motion to
suppress the evidence as violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the conviction.
The majority opinion began by subsuming the traditional inquiry
of standing within the issue of Fourth Amendment protection by rea-
soning that only those whose Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated may move to suppress evidence from an unreasonable search
and seizure. 43 The majority applied the Katz analysis to determine if
any substantive protection existed, an analysis where "arcane distinctions
developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees,
and the like, ought not to control."" The Court concluded that the
defendants in Rakas did not meet the "legitimate expectation of privacy"
standard enunciated in Katz because "[they asserted neither a property
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. 416 U.S. 861, 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
39. Id. at 865, 94 S. Ct. at 2116.
40. Id. at 865, 94 S. Ct. at 2115.
41. 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
42. Id. at 143-44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 430-31 n.12.
43. Id. at 138-40, 99 S. Ct. at 427-28. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 60, 172 (1979).
44. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430.
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nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property
seized." ' 45 Justice White pointed out in his dissenting opinion that al-
though the majority "assert[ed] that it [was] not limiting the Fourth
Amendment bar against unreasonable searches to the protection of prop-
erty rights," in essence they "[did] exactly that."' The only interests
given a "clear stamp of legitimacy" by the Rakas court are those based
upon property and related concepts of possession and control.4 7 As one
commentator has pointed out, "[in the name of developing the Katz
'privacy' test, the Rakas Court has instead revived the centrality of
property and possession by explicitly investing only the owner/possessor
with a clear 'legitimate expectation."' 4 Rakas, embracing all that Katz
rejected, marks the first clear undermining of the Katz rationale.
In Oliver v. United States,49 the Supreme Court again interpreted
the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment in light of property
distinctions. Police officers received an anonymous tip that marijuana
was growing on defendant's farmland, entered the "posted and fenced"
Oliver farm without obtaining a warrant, and, after spotting marijuana
in a field, arrested Oliver. The Court held that protections of the Fourth
Amendment do not extend to open fields, defining the test of a rea-
sonable privacy interest to be "whether the government's intrusion infr-
inges upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment," rather than "whether the individual chooses to conceal
asserted 'private' activity." 5 0 Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
listed the relevant factors in a determination of a reasonable privacy
interest to be "the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,
... the uses to which the individual has put a location, . . . and our
societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous
protection from governmental invasion."'" Relying upon these factors,
the Court decided that open fields are not areas that society is prepared
to consider protected by the Fourth Amendment regardless of the privacy
expectation which an individual manifests.5 2
Once more, while stating adherence to the Katz rationale, the Court
in fact decided the case in a way arguably inconsistent with the Katz
decision. As one commentator has pointed out, "[als a per se exception,
the open fields rule is an irrebutable presumption that an individual can
45. Id. at 148, 99 S. Ct. at 433.
46. Id. at 164, 99 S. Ct. at 441 (White, J., dissenting).
47. Fiss, supra note 44, at 178.
48. Id.
49. 466 U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
50. Id. at 182-83, 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
51. Id. at 178, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
52. Note that the Oliver Court, however, did consider the area "immediately sur-
rounding and associated with the home" as protected. Id. at 180, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
19871 1373
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have no reasonable expectation of privacy in certain areas. The pre-
sumption turns solely on the nature of the area itself," rendering it
"inconsistent with the basis of Katz [which was that] an individual is
protected by the fourth amendment irrespective of the nature or the
location of his or her activities, as long as he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy there."" Theoinquiry into Fourth Amendment
violations, therefore, relied upon the use of pre-Katz property analysis,
but with a slight twist. Instead of considering the viewing location of
the police to determine if a search had taken place by physical trespass
upon property, the Court examined the type of property allegedly searched
to determine the extent of privacy rights attached to it.
Just as the Supreme Court has declared that open fields warrant
no protection under the Fourth Amendment, other property concepts
have been used to conclude that the home and the land which closely
surrounds it are entitled to a heightened privacy interest.14 The protection
afforded the home is not as important to a discussion of aerial obser-
vations as is the concept of "curtilage." Curtilage, defined as that "area
which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life,""' is afforded heightened pro-
tection by the courts . 6 The curtilage historically derived its protection
from its use as an actual living area; "[t]his dwelling area-called the
curtilage-was readily discernible when the kitchen, the laundry, the
springhouse, the woodshed, and most particularly the 'outhouse' were
not within the four walls of the mansion house."5 7 Although the curtilage
of a home rarely contains such physical necessities today, it remains a
vital part of home life by providing a secluded area for hobbies and
recreation. Only by protecting the curtilage can that core protection of
the home and those activities associated with the home truly be safe-
guarded."
53. Comment, Affirmation of the Open Fields Doctrine: The Oliver Twist, 46 Ohio
St. L. J. 729, 748 (1985) (emphasis added).
54. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679 (1961). See generally Moylan, The Fourth
Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold
of "So What?" 1977 S. Ill. U. L. J. 75.
55. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532 (1886)).
56. See sources cited in supra note 54.
57. Moylan, supra note 54, at 87. For further commentary on the curtilage doctrine
see generally Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed
Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 795 (1985).
58. This paper is not concerned with the physical scope of the curtilage doctrine
since the Ciraolo Court found that Ciraolo's backyard was within the curtilage of his
home. It is interesting to note, however, that in United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134,
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The curtilage doctrine was discussed in Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,5 9 the companion case to Ciraolo. In Dow, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) hired a private commercial photographer to
take photographs of the outside of Dow's Michigan plant. The pho-
tographer used a precision aerial mapping camera to photograph the
complex from lawful navigable airspace. The Supreme Court held that
this warrantless aerial photography of the industrial complex was not
a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing that the
"narrow issue raised" was the lawfulness of observation "without phys-
ical entry" rather than a finding of "business curtilage."0 The Court
found the area at issue to be "somewhere between 'open fields' and
curtilage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics of both." '61
Although finding that Dow possessed a "reasonable, legitimate, and
objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered build-
ings," the Court concluded that "[t]he intimate activities associated with
family privacy and the home and its curtilage simply do not reach the
outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a manu-
facturing plant." '62 Dow's contention that it had manifested an expec-
tation of privacy by preventing ground level viewing of its complex,
"although a potential factor in a Katz expectation of privacy analysis,
was irrelevant to the Court's open fields analysis. ' 6 Just as in Oliver,
the Court applied a per se rule based upon property concepts which
ignored parts of the Katz analysis, while implying that a different rule
would be applicable to a private residence and its curtilage.
In summary, interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in search
cases has taken a decidedly winding path. A search, an intrusive "quest
by an officer of the law," 64 was originally defined by the use of property
concepts which focused on the location of the policeman at the time
1139-40 (1987), the Supreme Court seriously limited the definition of curtilage by finding
that a barn was not included within the curtilage of a farmhouse. Such a finding is
contrary to the "overwhelming majority of state courts" and those lower federal courts
which "have consistently held that barns are included within the curtilage of a farmhouse."
Id. at 1143 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Dunn considers the scope of property to be deemed
curtilage, whereas Ciraolo considers the level of privacy interests that curtilage warrants
under the Fourth Amendment.
59. 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
60. Id. at 1826.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1825.
63. Halpern, Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S.-Aerial Surveillance, 13 Search and Seizure
L. Rep. 49, 53-54 (1986).
64. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76, 26 S. Ct. 370, 379 (1906) (disapproved of on
other grounds, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n. of N. Y. Harbor, 378 U. S. 52, 69-70,
84 S. Ct. 1594, 1604 (1964)). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct.
341 (1914) (questioned by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 210-211, 80 S. Ct. 1437,
1140-1441 (1960)).
19871 1375
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
of the supposed "search." A physical trespass was required to invoke
Fourth Amendment protection. Katz extended the Fourth Amendment
protections beyond mere property interests; a physical trespass deter-
mination was not as important as a determination of the existing privacy
expectations. A search is now considered an intrusive quest by an officer
of the law "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable is infringed. ' 65 Katz, however, has not been con-
sistently followed. Dow and Rakas demonstrate the Court's continued
reliance upon property concepts to interpret and apply Katz.
The Ciraolo Opinion
The majority opinion in Ciraolo began its discussion by mapping
out the Katz test, for "[tihe touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis
is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expec-
tation of privacy." ' 66 The Court concluded that Ciraolo had manifested
a subjective expectation of privacy "from at least street level views ' 67
by virtue of his ten foot fence, but questioned whether this expectation
of privacy extended to "all observations of his backyard, or whether
instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his
unlawful gardening pursuits. ' ' 68 However, because the state did not
challenge the finding of the California Court of Appeal that Ciraolo
had manifested such an expectation, the first part of the Katz test was
not at issue. 69
The second part of the Katz test was the main focus of the opinion:
whether Ciraolo's expectation of privacy in his backyard activity was
an expectation which society would consider reasonable. The Court,
relying upon Oliver, stated that .'[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether
the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity,' but
instead 'whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal
and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."' 70 The Court
began its examination of the issue with the observation that the re-
spondent's yard was within the curtilage, "an area intimately linked to
65. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984). Note
that searches by private citizens, plain view, open fields, abandonment, and consent searches
are not searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. See Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1435 (1984); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S. Ct.
2395 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 80 S. Ct. 683 (1960); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574 (1921).
66. 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
67. Id. at 1812.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1811-12.
70. Id. at 1812.
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the home, both physically and psychologically."'" Implicitly, the Court
acknowledged that Ciraolo's expectation of privacy withiw his yard was
objectively reasonable with respect to ground-level surveillance. The Court
stated that although an area is deemed curtilage, that fact "does not
itself bar all police observation, ' 7 2 for .'[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection."' 7 3 According to the majority, Ciraolo
knowingly exposed his backyard to observation from the airways. The
officers involved did nothing more than observe what "[a]ny member
of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen"
and their observations took place in "a physically nonintrusive man-
ner." '74 This author submits that the majority's distinction between a
ground-level privacy interest and an aerial one is inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment's historical evolution and its jurisprudential devel-
opment as intended under Katz.
The Court has associated the curtilage with those privacy interests
specified by Katz as protected by the Fourth Amendment. As stated in
Oliver, "[tihe distinction [between 'open fields' and 'curtilage'] implies
that . . . the curtilage . . . warrants the Fourth Amendment protections
that attach to the home." ' 75 The court of appeals decision in Dow stated
that the curtilage should be considered an extension of the home not
solely because of proximity, but because "people have both actual and
reasonable expectations that many of the private experiences of home
life often occur outside the house. Personal interactions, daily routines
and intimate relationships revolve around the entire home place." '76
Before Ciraolo, the Court had made no distinctions between the curtilage
and the home in the Fourth Amendment context.
The majority opinion in Ciraolo, while acknowledging that the area
surveilled was within the curtilage of the Ciraolo home, limited to
"ground level observation" the Fourth Amendment protection. 77 This
analysis is flawed, for, in the Court's own words, "once it is recognized
that the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the
71. Id. Also stated is the contention that the "heightened" protection traditionally
afforded the curtilage "is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy." Id.
72. Id. at 1812 (emphasis added).
73. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967)).
74. Id. at 1813.
75. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742.
76. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
106 S. Ct. 47 (1986).
77. 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. at 1812. Apparently, when Ciraolo erected two fences
around his yard he established a "ground-level" expectation of privacy which society
would consider reasonable. From the air, however, these fences did not have the same
effect. Id.
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reach of that amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of
a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."" s Distinguishing ground-
level observation from aerial observation for purposes of interpreting
the Fourth Amendment signals a return to the analysis adhered to in
pre-Katz cases, namely a reliance upon the physical position of the
observer rather than upon the privacy interests of the observed. A return
to the pre-Katz reliance upon physical trespass before invocation of the
Fourth Amendment ignores not only nineteen years of jurisprudence,
but focuses attention upon the government's actions instead of upon
the privacy rights of the citizen.
There are also problems with the majority's assertion that because
the Ciraolo backyard was within aerial "plain view" there existed no
privacy expectation from the air. Plain view observation must first be
distinguished from plain view search and seizure. Plain view observation,
or open view, refers to the reasonableness of the government's obser-
vation of something that has been knowingly made accessible to public
view. In Ker v. California, 79 the Court stated that discovery of evidence
"did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was
placed before him in full view." 80
In Ciraolo, the Court uses language reminiscent of Ker when it
states, "the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict
some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer's observations
from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which
renders the activities clearly visible." 8 The Ciraolo Court, however, fails
to address the incompatibility of Katz and the plain view observation
doctrine. As the majority opinion in Ciraolo properly points out, Katz
states that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. '82 The Katz Court, however, continues with the statement that
"what he [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 83 Prior to
Katz there was no conflict between a privacy doctrine rooted in "con-
stitutionally protected areas" and the plain view doctrine under Ker,
since "the two concepts were mutually exclusive for there could be no
78. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512 (1967). As Professor
Amsterdam stated, '[s]earches' are not particular methods by which government invades
constitutionally protected interests: they are a description of the conclusion that such
interests have been invaded." Amsterdam, supra note 31, at 385.
79. 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623 (1963).
80. Id. at 43, 83 S. Ct. at 1635. See also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
465, 52 S. Ct. 420, 423 (1932); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S. Ct. 746 (1927).
81. 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
82. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511).
83. 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511.
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freedom from plain view observation unless one was in a totally enclosed
space, unobservable to the public through any method. ' s4 With Katz,
however, the privacy concept was expanded beyond property law de-
terminations to include a reasonable subjective privacy expectation, while
the plain view doctrine continued to objectively equate privacy with
enclosed space, unobservable to the public. As one commentator notes,
it is quite conceivable under Katz "that one could have a reasonable
expectation of privacy and still be legally observed within the meaning
of the physical presence test of plain view." 85 The Ciraolo court's reliance
upon "open view" to justify a finding of no Fourth Amendment in-
trusion emphasizes the deterioration of the Katz privacy conception in
favor of a property doctrine analysis.
Additionally, the Court's conclusion that the aerial surveillance of
the defendant's backyard was not a search has an interesting impact
upon Fourth Amendment seizure provisions. To characterize aerial ob-
servation as plain view observation may cause an irreparable infringement
upon Fourth Amendment protections, given the interrelationship between
open view observation and plain view seizure.
The plain view seizure doctrine refers to the permissible seizure of
evidence found when there is a "prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which [an officer comes] inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused." '86 As an exception to the warrant
requirement, the plain view seizure doctrine, outlined in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,7 attempts to set the requirements of an admissible
seizure in the context of a warrant authorized search or otherwise lawful
intrusion by requiring an inadvertent discovery of the evidence and an
immediate recognition of its incriminating nature.8
In Arizona v. Hicks, 9 the latest Supreme Court case to address the
issue of plain view search and seizure, the majority ignored the inad-
vertency element which the plurality opinion in Coolidge first estab-
84. 3 Search and Seizure L. Rep. 2 (Feb. 1976).
85. Id.
86. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038 (1971)
(plurality opinion). Note that Coolidge also discusses a plain view search, which is to be
analyzed under the same criteria as a plain view seizure. Such a doctrine, however, is
distinguishable from open view or plain view observation in that the former is a search
excepted from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, whereas an open view under
Ker is not considered a search. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738-39, 103 S.
Ct. 1535, 1541 (1983) (plurality opinion); New York v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100
S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980).
87. 403 U.S. 433, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
88. Id. at 466, 91 S. Ct. at 2038.
89. 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
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lished.9° Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, discussed the plain view
seizure doctrine as formulated under Coolidge, but stated that probable
cause would be required in order to invoke the plain view doctrine in
the context of searches as well as seizures. 9' The majority opinion
distinguished a search from a cursory inspection of objects in open
view, but failed to discuss the inadvertency prong of the doctrine. 92 In
fact, the probable cause requirement to the plain view doctrine established
by Hicks may be mutually exclusive of an inadvertence element. 93 The
status of an inadvertency requirement in open view or plain view ob-
servation, however, is unclear.
In Ciraolo, the plain view seizure doctrine had no application since
the officers who observed Ciraolo's home obtained a warrant before
entering his property to seize the marijuana growing in his backyard.
Likewise, a plain view search was not involved since the Court concluded
that no search had taken place. The Ciraolo Court's reasoning, however,
may become the foundation for a future finding that what is observed
from the air may also be seized without a warrant. In Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,94 the Court gives the following example of a prior valid
intrusion which permits a warrantless seizure: "[T]he plain view doctrine
has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an in-
90. In Hicks, the police validly entered a residential apartment without a search
warrant under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. While
searching for a gunman, weapons, and victims involved in a recent shooting, the policemen
observed two high quality sound systems in the home. Suspecting the stero equipment to
be stolen, the officers moved some of the components in order to read and record serial
numbers affixed to the base of the equipment; after confirming that the equipment was
stolen, the officers seized the stereos. The Supreme Court found that the officers' conduct
was a search that went beyond mere inspection of objects in open view. Id. at 1151-53.
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978), for a discussion of the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
91. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152-54.
92. Id. at 1154. See related discussion in text accompanying supra note 87. Note that
Justice White's concurrence stated that the inadvertency 'requirement' of the plain view
doctrine has never been accepted by a judgment supported by a majority of this court."
Id. at 1155 (White, J., concurring).
93. Professor Whitebread's discussion of inadvertency which concludes that "it seems
correct to say that a discovery will be inadvertent whenever there is the absence of probable
cause to secure a warrant." C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure 217-20 (1980). The
inadvertenancy prong of the plain view doctrine as established by Coolidge v. New
Hampshire and as defined by Whitebread is inconsistent with the Hicks mandate that
only a finding of probable cause may invoke the plain view doctrine. See also Mapp v.
Warden, 531 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982, 97 S. Ct. 498 (1976);
United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941, 94 S.
Ct. 1945 (1974).
94. 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
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criminating object." 9 Reference is then made to Ker. This passage
suggests that an open view observation, or "cursory inspection" under
Hicks, must be inadvertent and that such an observation may be the
basis of a permissible seizure. 96
By labeling an intentional observation as a plain view observation
incapable of being classified as a search, the Ciraolo court conceivably
establishes the right of a police officer not only to observe, but also
to seize that which he observes in an aerial overflight, given the inter-
relationship between open view and plain view seizures. The Hicks
requirement of probable cause before a warrantless seizure may validly
occur can easily be met with information gathered in the aerial obser-
vation. An aerial overflight may authorize an actual, physical trespass
for purposes of seizing that which is observed.
In addition, as the dissent in Ciraolo points out, the majority "fails
to acknowledge the qualitative difference between police surveillance and
other uses of the air space .... [T]he actual risk to privacy from
commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually nonexistent" since such trav-
elers normally obtain the most "nondiscriminating glimpse" of the land
over which they travel. 7 The fact that a person is aware of possible
commercial flight in navigable airways over his home does not mean
that he should be deemed to have waived his privacy rights with respect
to governmental observation. The Fourth Amendment was specifically
designed to protect citizens from governmental intrusion. "The fact that
Peeping Toms abound does not license the government to follow suit." 9s
The majority failed to differentiate between potential observation
by private citizens and the calculated surveillance by police in Ciraolo.99
As the dissent states, "the Court certainly would agree that he [the
policeman in Ciraolo] would have conducted an unreasonable search
had he climbed over the fence, or used a ladder to peer into the yard
without first securing a warrant."'0 Since the police in Ciraolo rented
a plane only after failing to see over Ciraolo's fence, they arguably did
"jump" the fence. Screening a yard from aerial view, thereby depriving
it of those qualities which render it a backyard, is nothing more than
95. Id. at 466, 91 S. Ct. at 2038.
96. If open view requires inadvertent discovery, then "[t]he spirit of the warrant
requirement might easily be subverted if a level of suspicion below probable cause will
support a finding of inadvertence." Whitebread, supra note 93, at 218. The Hicks Court
does not address the issue of inadvertence in the context of open view. Justice Scalia
states that a cursory investigation, as a nonsearch, "does not even require reasonable
suspicion." 107 S. Ct. at 1154.
97. 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw. 1976).
99. See the majority's hypothetical examples, Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. at
1812-13.
100. Id. at 1817 (Powell, J. dissenting).
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a deliberate attempt to avoid the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Without the review of a magistrate to determine if probable cause
for a search exists, aerial surveillance becomes little more than the type
of general warrant which the Fourth Amendment was adopted to pre-
vent. 101
Moreover, the possibility that someone may intrude upon another's
privacy does not mean that one has "knowingly" exposed an object or
activity. The defendant in Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy
despite the possible consideration that his conversation could be tapped
by the FBI or interpreted by a lip-reader in the vicinity. He did not
abandon his privacy right with respect to his telephone call by not taking
precautions to guard against the possibility of such invasions. To hold
that abandonment occurred would allow any surveillance technique to
be nonintrusive simply by warning the public of the possibility of its
use. If citizens then did not take precautions to guard against the
technique, they would be deemed to have "knowingly" exposed them-
selves or their activities to a position beyond the reach of the Fourth
Amendment protection. By differentiating between a ground-level privacy
interest and an aerial one, the majority stands for the proposition that
any outdoor activity is "knowingly exposed" to the public since all are
aware of the existence of airplanes. The reasoning is at odds with the
opinion in Katz, where the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy
was the focal point of the inquiry, and not an examination of the
precautions taken by Katz with respect to the observation techniques of
law enforcement officials. Such reasoning forces a homeowner to take
unreasonable precautions to guard against the possibility of aerial ob-
servation, and, it is submitted, forces him to compromise the dignity
and usefulness of his property-a backyard with an opaque covering
ceases to function properly as a backyard.
Conclusion
In accord with Katz, the inquiry in a Fourth Amendment case should
be into the impact that the challenged governmental conduct will have
upon a person's sense of security and liberty. The Katz privacy standard,
however, has been greatly undermined. The Supreme Court has only
nominally applied the Katz rationale, relying instead upon property
concepts in formulating per se rules which deny protection to certain
physical areas.10 2
101. Id. at 1817, 1819 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102. A study of the line of cases involving car searches further reveals how the Supreme
Court relies upon property distinctions in defining the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985); United States
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Through its use of property concepts to determine a Fourth Amend-
ment violation, the Ciraolo Court further upset the delicate balance
which should exist between personal liberty and societal security. As
Justice Powell states in his dissent in Ciraolo: "Some may believe that
this case, involving no physical intrusion on private property, presents
'the obnoxious thing in its mildest form' .... [b]ut this court recognized
long ago that the essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is 'not the
breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,' but
rather is 'the invasion of his indefensible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property.""' 103
The Ciraolo Court should not have allowed the Fourth Amendment
inquiry to turn upon the presence or absence of a physical trespass, for
there are many conceivable, unreasonable nontrespasses which may be
constitutionally permissible under such reasoning. Technological ad-
vancement is proceeding at a rapid pace and with it comes a change
in the very nature of human existence. The danger of losing the capacity
to "shape our own destiny ... is particularly ominous when the new
technology is designed for surveillance purposes, for in this case, the
tight relationship between technology and power is most obvious. Control
over the technology of surveillance conveys effective control over our
privacy, our freedom and our dignity-in short, control over most
meaningful aspects of our lives as free human beings."' °4 The Ciraolo
reasoning opens the door for technological advancements to be used as
general warrants, allowing circumvention of the Fourth Amendment
merely because of unobtrusiveness. The Court's decision in Ciraolo steps
beyond the mere affirmation of unobtrusive searches-the majority con-
dones such practices exercised in an area as sacred to a person's right
to privacy and individuality as his home.
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